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INTRODUCTION
Imagine meeting someone special, falling in love, and deciding to
start a life together as “one.” The two of you plan to get married and
live happily ever after. However, the state where you both live does not
legally recognize same-sex marriages. To bypass your home state’s
rigid laws, you travel with your partner to a neighboring state where
your marriage can be legally recognized. You obtain a marriage
license, exchange your vows, and move forward with your life as a
married couple. As expected, your marriage is blissful, but
unfortunately, your spouse falls ill with a debilitating disease and
ultimately dies.
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Since your home state still does not recognize same-sex marriages,
you are precluded from being named as the surviving spouse. Even at
death, a state-imposed separation forces you to remain strangers with
your former spouse, so you decide enough is enough and fight back by
filing suit. Your case goes all the way up to the United States Supreme
Court, where the Court will decide the constitutionality of the same-sex
marriage ban. In its analysis, the Court must consider whether a
relationship like yours, a same-sex marriage, is deeply rooted in our
nation’s history and tradition, making it a fundamental right requiring
substantive due process protection. 1
However, relevant case law does not provide any definitions of
history and tradition, much less any separate analysis of the two terms.
You begin to worry and wonder whether history and tradition are used
interchangeably by the Court. Without a clear definition of these two
terms, this deeply personal and very important right could have a
vunerable outcome. So, what does “history and tradition” 2 really mean
in a substantive due process analysis?
In a substantive due process analysis, the notion of “history and
tradition” is used to test whether a right is deemed fundamental, and
thus protected. 3 The Court uses this test to resolve substantive due
process issues; however, the Court has yet to define the two terms
explicitly. Often, the words are conflated without explanation. 4 This

1. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (the fact pattern
described above is based on this case where fundamental rights were at stake).
2. Traditions are often valued memories or customs passed down that one can
look forward to in the future. See infra Part II. In this respect, tradition provides status
and identity. However, the notion of tradition is a choice, based on what is valued
highly enough to be deemed traditional or a tradition. Ruth Finnegan, Tradition, But
What Tradition and For Whom?, in 06 ORAL TRADITION 104, 104 (1991). Thus,
tradition is heavily impacted by choice and value. Unlike traditions, history cannot
be impacted by values or choices. In contrast, history is an objective analysis of what
has occurred in the past. See infra Part I. History can also look beyond the individual
law being challenged and consider the underlying components, which establish the
right at issue. See infra Part III. Together, tradition considers values and choices, while
history is objectively informed by the past.
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland., 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
4. See, e.g., Zablock v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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leaves the Court with broad discretion in discerning what is deeply
rooted in our nation’s history and tradition. 5 However, without a clear
definition of these two terms, a deeply personal and very important
right, such as the right to marry, could become obsolete.
This Comment analyzes the terms “history” and “tradition” and
proposes a clear, two-part test, that defines and separates these terms
when conducting a fundamental rights analysis. While the Court has
been vague in its analysis when addressing history and tradition, 6 the
terms are not interchangeable, and a two-part test is necessary to
provide clarity in such a significant analysis of fundamental rights. 7
Part I dissects the definition of “history” in judicial interpretations and
literary definitions, and addresses whether defining “history” is an
objective or subjective standard. Part II has a mirrored analysis of Part
I, in analyzing the term “tradition.” Part III addresses “the overlapping
characteristic of both “history” and “tradition,” the judicial
interpretation of “history and tradition” together, and ultimately
recommends a two-part test to address the terms separately. Finally,
this Comment briefly concludes with an explanation of why a test
analyzing the two terms separately is necessary in a substantive due
process analysis.
I. DEFINING “HISTORY”
Broadly, history is a systematic account of humankinds’ origin and
development throughout time, producing a record of the unique
movements and moments in life. 8 As such, history remains diversely
valuable and useful. 9 Every generation looks to the past to serve as
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.
E. Sreedharan, A Textbook of Historiography, 500 B.C. to A.D. 2000, ORIENT
LONGMAN
PRIVATE
LIMITED
1,
1
(2004),
https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/247238/8/08_chapter%20i.pdf.
9. Maurice Matloff, The Nature of History, A GUIDE TO THE STUDY AND USE OF
MILITARY
HISTORY
3,
17
(1979),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5b8f/ceb5a8636f4c1d4959bb2deb82a4d416f981.pd
f. The notion of history plays a fundamental role in the process of human thought. In
this respect, history provides the possibility of better understanding or discovering
ourselves in the present, by understanding the circumstances and choices that brought
us to our current lives and situations.
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guidance, knowledge, wisdom, or a source of ideas to meet its own
problems. 10 Although history provides society with a sense of identity,
human beings create it themselves. 11 Without human action, history
would not exist. 12
The word “history” generally connotes the past. 13 The Greek word
historia originally meant knowing by inquiry or the act of seeking
knowledge. 14 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “history” as “a
chronological record of significant events (such as those affecting a
nation or institution) often including an explanation of their causes.”15
In Ancient Greece, historiography was considered more as moral
guidance, than factual accuracy, 16 and any bad examples were
conveniently ignored. 17
However, over time, Western Civilization’s thought of history has
contemporaneously tended to follow a linear progression. 18 By the
Nineteenth Century, the notion of presenting objective historical facts
became prevalent when interpreting history. 19 As such, history is a
method of understanding the development and evolution of ideas and
past actions. 20 When considering the idea of history, it is easy to think
about past events. For example, when students study history in school,

10. Id.
11. See Daniel Little, Philosophy of History, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/history/ (last updated Oct.
13, 2016).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Katy Steinmetz, This Is Where the Word ‘History’ Comes From, TIME (June
23, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://time.com/4824551/history-word-origins/.
15. History, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/history (last updated Mar. 25, 2020).
OF
PHIL.,
16. See
Philosophy
of
History,
BASICS
https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_philosophy_of_history.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2020) (historiography refers to the processes by which historical knowledge
is obtained and transmitted. “Good examples” to be followed were considered to
morally improve the reader).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Matloff, supra note 9.
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they are learning about past events. 21 We rely on historians to interpret,
describe, conceptualize, contextualize, and explain circumstances and
events of the past. 22 The significance of history relies on understanding
the evolution and development of ideas and understanding why these
ideas changed or occurred in the past. 23 Therefore, history is connected
to past events because it represents the recollection or objective study
of events that have occurred in the past.
A. Judicial Interpretation of “History”
The Court has held history teaches and develops traditions.24
History became an indicator of past events because it was viewed as a
way of teaching and assisting in the development of tradition. 25 In the
seminal gun rights case—McDonald v. City of Chicago—the Court
relied on a survey of contemporaneous history within the nation, which
demonstrated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers included the right
to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right. 26 Because the Court
framed the right to keep and bear arms (“gun rights”) as the right to
self-defense, 27 the Court considered the history and tradition of the right
to protect your own home, rather than whether general gun rights held
a position deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition. 28 Since
the Court previously held “the Second Amendment protects a personal
right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for selfdefense within the home,” 29 the Court found the right to self-defense
was deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition. The Court based
its decision on the Second Amendment representing past acts,
21. See Peter N. Stearns, Why Study History? (1998), AM. HIST. ASS’N,
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-andarchives/historical-archives/why-study-history-(1998) (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
22. Little, supra note 11.
23. Ronald B. Standler, What Is History and Why Is History Important?,
http://www.rbs0.com/wh.pdf (last updated Feb. 18, 2013).
24. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
25. Id.
26. 561 U.S. 742, 745 (2010).
27. Id. at 780.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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specifically, “history” in our nation. 30 Consequently, the Court
determined gun rights were deeply rooted in our nation’s history and
tradition based on the existence of the right included in the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution.31 Thus, the past actions
of the United States informed the Court’s decision to establish the right
to keep and bear arms was deeply rooted in our nation’s history.
In United States v. Windsor, the Court decided whether the Defense
of Marriage Act’s (“DOMA”) definition of a spouse, which denied
federal recognition of same-sex marriages, was unconstitutional. 32 In
his dissent, Justice Roberts notes it was “beyond dispute that the right
to same-sex marriage [was] not deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history
and tradition.” 33 This statement follows the prior treatment of samesex marriage in the United States. 34 Because same-sex marriages were
not yet fully recognized in every state, Justice Roberts argued the right
to same-sex marriage was not part of the nation’s history. 35 In this
respect, the notion of history is traditionally interpreted and informed
by looking at prior conduct and events in the United States. However,
the Court ultimately found DOMA’s definition of a spouse to be a
violation of equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it was exclusively defined as a relationship
between a man and a woman. 36 The Court held this distinction singled
out people in same-sex marriages without a legitimate government
purpose. 37 Thus, DOMA’s definition of a spouse was unconstitutional.
This decision established a new history for same-sex marriages in the
United States.

30. The Court successfully avoided engaging in a meaningful analysis of history
and tradition by focusing on history and ignoring tradition. See id.
31. Id. at 791.
32. 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013).
33. Id. at 808 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. (noting that “no State permitted same-sex marriage until the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution.”).
35. Id.
36. Id. at769.
37. Id. at 775.
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Throughout American history, states have valued marriage as a
societal benefit. 38 As such, the historical record of marriage
“contradicts attempts to cast marriage as serving any single, overriding
purpose.” 39 When Congress refused to federally recognize potential
marriages of same-sex couples, it interfered with a long history of state
autonomy by denying states the ability to bestow these couples the same
fundamental status that other couples received when their state
permitted them to marry. 40 As our federal system allows, marriage
rules significantly differ among states. 41 As such, states established
many marital innovations—including changing aspects of marriage
“once seen as essential and indispensable.” 42 Alterations to the marital
union, such as the erosion of coverture and the broadening of grounds
for divorce, may be taken for granted now. 43 However, these alterations
were aggressively resisted and opposed as revolutionary when they
began. 44 What is now viewed as deeply rooted in our nation’s history
was once a new and debated topic. Moreover, history changes and
evolves as the country develops. 45 Due to the long history of states
having authority to establish marital unions, DOMA was deemed as a
“radical departure from settled federal practice,” 46 and therefore not
deeply rooted in our nation’s history.
As noted, marriage is not “a static institution so rooted in
‘tradition’’’—that it can be insulated from constitutional challenge.47
On the contrary, marriage remains a crucial institution due to its non38. Brief on the Merits for Amici Curiae Historians - American Historical
Association - in Support of Respondents and of Affirmance of the Judgement Below
at 2, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307) WL840030
[hereinafter Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents].
39. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) WL1022698 [hereinafter Brief of
Historians of Marriage].
40. Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 14.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Again, presently made choices have impactful weight in the future.
46. Am. Historical Ass’n. Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 34.
47. Brief of Historians of Marriage, supra note 39, at 4.
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static characteristics. 48
Because previous “traditions and laws
enforcing gender hierarchy (through coverture) and white supremacy
(through anti-miscegenation laws) have been overturned,” these
“traditional” actions are now unconstitutional.49 Similar to other
successful civil institutions, the tradition of marriage has evolved to
contemplate and reflect societal developments and the judicial
recognition of constitutional rights. 50
Additionally, the Court has held “history teaches [that there] are
the traditions from which [history] developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke.” 51 Following this, the Court found history can add
to or eliminate a tradition based on the values associated with the
tradition. 52 History has also taught us “tradition is a living thing” and
thus open to development. 53 When considering history—in the context
of larger family households—the Court has held that even in “a decline
in extended family households,” modern society has not eroded “the
accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and
honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of
family.” 54 The Court considered the past to be a roadmap for our
nation’s history. 55 As such, the past has been interpreted as analogous
to the term history, and the Court has looked at past conduct to inform
its classification as history. 56 Moreover, past events in the United States
contribute to what the Court interprets as the nation’s history because
history requires prior conduct. 57

48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 5-6. Both legislatures and courts have used their authority to lessen
marriage inequality between spouses and to lift restrictive rules on the eligibility to
marry. See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
50. Brief of Historians of Marriage, supra note 39, at 16.
51. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 505.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see also McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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B. Considerations of the Literary Definition of “History”
History is interpreted as a “recital of facts given as true,” and “an
essential part of natural philosophy.” 58 History is also defined as the
“study of the human past as it is described in written documents left
behind by humans.” 59 Thus, history has long served as a guide
illustrating the past. Analogous to its judicial interpretation, the term
history is driven by the theme of past events. 60 History cannot be
defined or developed without conduct or memory from the past. 61 In
its earliest known form in society, history was “simply a narrative
account of past events.” 62 Being developed and maintained by
humankind, “human nature is itself a historical product and human
beings act differently in different periods of historical development.” 63
Moreover, history cannot exist without prior acts or conduct. History
will always be impacted by current times and choices made; what
society considers as history in 2050 will be impacted by the choices and
actions people take in 2020. As such, what occurs in the history of the
United States impacts the Court and the interpretation of the American
Constitution.64 History itself has been seen as a process of qualitative
change evolving over time. 65 What will happen in the future, and what

58. Voltaire, The Philosophical Dictionary, HANOVER COLLEGE DEP’T OF
HIST., https://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volhisto.html (last updated Mar.
2001).
59. K.
Kris
Hirst,
What
Is
History?,
THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-history-collection-of-definitions-171282 (last
updated Oct. 1, 2019).
60. See supra Part I.
61. Id.
62. Bill Nasson, History: The Meaning and Role of History in Human
Development, EOLSS, https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E6-22-00-00.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2020).
63. Little, supra note 11 (describing how Johann Gottfried Herder offered a
different view about human nature and human ideas with respect to a historical
analysis).
64. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1995) (discussing the impact of
history).
65. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88
VA. L. REV. 485, 489 (2002) (addressing the contrast between the scholarly functions
of legal scholars and historians).
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materializes in the present, is governed closely by what has occurred in
the past. 66 Thus, history progresses as time changes, and our nation
evolves.
C. Is “History” an Objective or Subjective Standard?
Similar to the Constitution, history is read and interpreted in more
than one way. 67 The Court found it both prideful and unwise to blind
oneself to history. 68 History establishes a hybrid mix of objective
memory and subjective interpretation. 69 An intimate relationship exists
“between ‘objective’ history and the subjective development of the
individual consciousness (‘spirit’).” 70 Despite this, objectively, history
can be primarily viewed as something undisturbed by personal bias or
emotion and more closely related to actual and external phenomena.71
Further, history is generally the objective recitation of past events.
However, because these recitations can be personal and perceived
differently, history can objectively be recited, but subjectively
experienced or interpreted. 72 For example, history has been interpreted
as the process whereby the spirit uncovers itself and its own concept. 73
Just as scientists disagree, historians may also differ in their
interpretations. 74 However, history focuses on human values, in a
manner the sciences do not, allowing for a broader scope of

66. Arthur Marwick, The Fundamentals of History, OPEN U.,
https://archives.history.ac.uk/history-in-focus/Whatishistory/marwick1.html
(last
visited Aug. 1, 2020).
67. Nancy F. Cott, In Same-Sex Marriage Case, a Contest over History,
BOSTON REV. (July 1, 2015), http://bostonreview.net/us/nancy-cott-supreme-courtsame-sex-marriage-history.
68. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015).
69. See generally Little, supra note 11 (discussing how to pursue historical
objectivity in light of subjective values).
70. Id. (citing WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (J.N.
Findlay ed., A. V. Miller trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977).
71. Sakul Kundra, Objectivity in History, RESEARCH GATE (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31411340.
72. See supra Part I.
73. Little, supra note 11.
74. Marwick, supra note 66.
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evaluation. 75 Therefore, despite history being a primarily objective
analysis, it can also be subjectively interpreted.
II. DEFINING “TRADITION”
The concept of a tradition originally comes from the Latin meaning
of “something handed over.” 76 The word tradition has multiple
meanings. 77 In its barest form, tradition simply means “a traditum; it is
anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the
present.” 78 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines tradition as “[a]n
inherited, established, or customary pattern of thought, action, or
behavior (such as a religious practice or a social custom).” 79 Tradition,
and the notion of that which is handed down, includes beliefs, customs,
material objects, or images of persons and events. 80 At the center of a
tradition is the value one holds to carry on this custom or belief as being
established. Slow changing societies have viewed tradition as the
equivalence to inheritance. 81 The means of making a living, as well as
the stories and memories of their progenitors, provides one with both
status and identity. 82
Because tradition tends to look forward, the term refers to the
process of handing a custom down to later generations over time, 83 as
well as the belief that the custom will continue to be passed down in the
future. Traditions are based on values, and they will continue to evolve
because of the desire to establish something better, more authentic, or

75. Id.
76. Nelson H. H. Graburn, What is Tradition?, AM. ANTHROPOLOGY ASS’N. 6,
6
(2008),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gendersexuality/What%20is%20tradition.pdf.
77. EDWARD A. SHILS, TRADITION 12 (U. Chi. Press, 1981).
78. Id.
79. Tradition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/tradition (last updated Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Tradition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER].
80. SHILS, supra note 77, at 13.
81. Graburn, supra note 76, at 6–7 (discussing how tradition has been viewed
as a central and important concept of identity).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 6.
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more convenient—resting in those who acquire and create them. 84 A
tradition can be impacted by history. However, tradition is centered on
value and looks forward at a future event and considers whether it is
valued high enough to be passed down; thus, establishing a tradition or
custom. 85
A. Judicial Interpretation of “Tradition”
The Court has held that “history [teaches] us that tradition is a
living thing.” 86 When faced with the decision of the constitutionality
of a law requiring child support to be paid before getting married, the
Court held such a law was unconstitutional because it “infringed upon
a fundamental right, the right to marry.” 87 Justice Powell concurred in
the opinion, pointing to the “constitutional limits” as to state power over
domestic relations. 88 Further, because marriage has been a central
component, creating the most important relationship in one’s life, 89 the
government needed to show a justification in its actions. 90 The Court
reasoned these intrusions were contrary to deeply rooted traditions91
because marriage was seen as a—highly valued—component. 92 Thus,
the Court has interpreted tradition loosely, emphasizing value, to be a
passed down custom, continuing to be passed down and occurring in
the future.
Similarly, the Court recognized a relationship closely tied to the
right to marital privacy and found Connecticut’s anti-contraceptive
statute to be unconstitutional.93
The Court addressed the
constitutionality of the state’s statute when an Executive Director of
Planned Parenthood and a doctor were fined for violating Connecticut’s
anti-contraceptive statute; the Court addressed the constitutionality of

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

SHILS, supra note 77, at 13.
See infra Part II Section B.
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978).
Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888)).
See id. at 381.
See id. at 399.
Id. at 397.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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the state’s statute. 94 Justice Goldberg concurred in the opinion,
reiterating when fundamental rights are determined, judges are not left
to decide cases to reflect their personal and private notions. 95 Instead,
they must look to the history and tradition of our nation to determine
whether a right is fundamental. 96 Because marital privacy had a long
history within the nation and was viewed as a traditional value,
Connecticut’s statute prohibiting contraceptives was deemed
unconstitutional. 97
Moreover, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found a statute
criminalizing homosexual activity to be unconstitutional. 98 The Court
centered its focus on the notion of personal autonomy and the freedom
one holds to conduct his or her private life. 99 Further, the Court held,
“[h]istory and tradition are the starting point […] of the substantive due
process inquiry.” 100 In its analysis, the Court looked at the tradition of
one’s personal autonomy and freedom in the privacy of his or her own
home. 101 The Court held policing the private conduct in one’s home
was unconstitutional because the nation held a tradition (value) of
personal autonomy. 102
Accordingly, tradition can be both forward- and backward-looking,
but it is always centered on value. 103 With respect to a backward look
at customs from the past, the tradition of the right to marry carried
sufficient weight on its own to overrule a statute banning anyone with
outstanding child support obligations from marriage. 104 In a forwardlooking approach, the Court was able to overrule a ban on same-sex
private conduct. 105 Despite the lack of this social custom or lack of
94. See generally id.
95. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
99. Id. at 572.
100. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
101. Id. at 573.
102. Id. at 578 (holding the petitioners were entitled to respect in their private
lives).
103. See supra Part II.
104. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
105. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
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tradition in the nation, this conduct was not barred. Because the notion
of personal liberty in one’s private life helped guide the Court in its
decision, a new custom of same-sex relationships was established in the
nation’s tradition. 106 The reoccurring events not only create a history
of events, but it also establishes a tradition and emphasizes the values
of our nation.
B. Considerations of the Literary Definition of “Tradition”
The study of developing traditions is recently becoming more and
more popular and acceptable. 107 Although the notion of tradition is still
associated with the concept of something established, and perhaps old,
it is no longer assumed that this necessarily implies old in the sense of
years, far less multiple centuries. 108 Tradition has been summarized
into one word: “change.” 109 These changes and developments
associated with tradition can now be recognized as fit objects of
study. 110 Therefore, the general category of tradition is no longer a
clear-cut definition. Instead, it requires a further clarification of which
particular aspects or which specified historical or past situation is
referenced. 111 The changes in tradition are driven by the value or
disvalue placed on the concept at issue. 112 People must value a tradition
for it to continue to exist, 113 and the actual use of it—whether in
personal, artistic, or political contexts—may inevitably be exposed to
modification, manipulation, or even elimination.114 Thus, traditions
are constantly open to change, development, interpretation, and
occasional manipulation by those who follow or create them. 115
Despite tradition being open for development and change, the critical
aspect of tradition remains centered on value.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Finnegan, supra note 2.
108. Id. at 112.
109. Id. (quoting Honko and Laaksonen 1983:236 “Tradition is change” as a
recent summary of the term).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra Part II.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Tradition has sometimes been viewed as the opposite of
innovation. 116 However, it is a commonly used word, and it can be
elusive. 117 The concept of tradition holds a connotation to value, 118 and
the common use of the term has established meaning of something
handed down, particularly by word of mouth. 119 However, tradition
sometimes holds contrasting definitions.120 The view of what is
traditional may depend on what has been handed down or viewed as
valuable enough to be a tradition or traditional. 121 Traditions can
evolve as customs are passed down and selected to be labeled as such.
Initially, every tradition is based on the choices people make and
continue to make in the future, centered on their values. As time passes
and the nation’s values evolve, so too do laws and traditions. What was
once a tradition can cease to be held as traditional, based on choice and
value.
C. Is “Tradition” an Objective or Subjective Standard?
When discussing tradition, we refer to that which has exemplary
characteristics. 122 Tradition depends on what has been handed down
and valued high enough to be labeled tradition or traditional. 123 The
Court has held that what is a “deeply rooted tradition” of the country is
“arguable.” 124 As such, what is the tradition of one can contrast the
tradition of another entirely because not everyone holds the same
values. Moreover, tradition includes a choice because it involves value
and development. 125 Ultimately, the key factor in determining what is
considered a tradition rests on what custom or past event is valued
116. Graburn, supra note 76.
117. Finnegan, supra note 2.
118. Id. at 110 (commenting on the notion of value and whose values we are
considering for tradition).
119. Id. at 104.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. SHILS, supra note 77.
123. See Tradition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 79; see also Finnegan,
supra note 2.
124. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the “traditions” in the Nation).
125. See supra Part II.
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enough. 126 At a family gathering, choices are made, and traditions are
established as a result of these choices and actions. While a tradition
may be viewed objectively, based on previous conduct and customs,
those customs are subjectively selected by choice. 127 Therefore,
creating a tradition is decided subjectively by values and informed by
the interpretation of past events.
III. THE CORRECT ANALYSIS: “HISTORY” AND “TRADITION” AS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT TERMS
Although history and tradition may overlap, with respect to the
past, they are distinct terms in all other aspects. History is the
development or objective recounting of past events. 128 In contrast,
tradition is centered on values and choice and does not simply recount
the past . 129 While a tradition can be modified and adjusted based on
one’s subjective values, 130 history cannot be modified according to
one’s personal preference. 131 The critical distinction between the two
terms rests on the ability of tradition to be established or discontinued
based on the creators’ or adopters’ values and choices. In contrast,
history cannot be changed or eliminated once an action has been taken.
Consequently, because history and tradition are not
interchangeable, both terms, as a part of the two-part test, must be
satisfied to be afforded substantive due process protection. A test that
analyzes history and tradition separately creates a clear analysis for the
Court to follow. This test requires a fact-by-fact analysis, based on the
totality of the circumstances. 132 For example, what society will
consider history and tradition in 2050 will be impacted by choices and
actions in 2020, 133 and the decisions the Court makes in 2020 will
impact litigants in 2050. A two-part test of history and tradition will

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Sreedharan, supra note 8.
See supra Part II.
Finnegan, supra note 2, at 112.
See supra Part I.
See infra Part III Section C.
See supra Part I Section B.
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provide uniformity and eliminate the Court’s vague use of the terms in
a substantive due process analysis.
The first part of the two-part test looks at history. The test does not
look plainly at past events in history. Rather, it also requires looking
beyond the individual law being challenged, and considers the
underlying components and factors establishing its history. 134 Because
history cannot exist without human action, history develops and evolves
as society continues to grow and carve out history. 135 The second part
of the test considers the concepts and customs. These concepts and
customs are determined by what is highly valued by our nation to deem
it a tradition. Thus, tradition is driven by value and change. 136 What
we value can develop and progress as our concepts and customs
evolve. 137
A. The Overlapping Characteristics of “History” and “Tradition”
In cases discussing fundamental rights in a substantive due process
analysis, courts analyze whether a right is “deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and tradition.” 138 However, the Court has never provided a
separate and distinct definition for each term. 139 Vaguely, courts
established both “history” and “tradition” hold different definitions in
substantive due process cases. 140 Because history is developed by
humankind literally and recounts past events in life, 141 it is not only a
roadmap of past moments; it also creates a sense of identity for

134. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015)
135. See supra Part I.
136. See supra Part II.
137. Id. Together, history objectively looks at past events and the underlying
circumstances of the right at issue, while tradition analyzes what past events, customs,
or concepts are valued important enough by the nation to be deemed a tradition or
traditional.
138. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Sreedharan, supra note 8.
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society. 142 Similarly, tradition can provide a level of identity and status
by way of passing down objects, beliefs, and concepts of value. 143
Tradition can be influenced by history. 144 However, history is not
established nor shaped by tradition. 145 Rather, sometimes, split-second
actions or decisions create history. Although the two terms both
involve decisions and actions of the past, they each hold separate and
distinct definitions. 146 For example, the history of a family tree is
created by past actions or choices made, while family traditions rest on
the value we place on certain events or customs to continue occurring
in the future. There is value in analyzing both terms separately because
of the very different meanings each term holds. Grouping the terms
together exposes the vulnerability of missing the two terms’ separate
and essential definitions.
B. Judicial Interpretation of “History and Tradition” as a Whole
The Court has not defined history and tradition separately. 147
However, when analyzed as a whole, the Court has loosely
distinguished history to represent the past and applied both a forward
and backward look at customs and social norms to represent
traditions. 148
This analysis was applied in Obergefell v. Hodges, where the full
recognition of same-sex marriage and marital benefits were at issue. 149
While the Court held that the history of marriage has always been a
union between a male and a female, the Court noted the “[t]he history
of marriage is one of both continuity and change.” 150 Thus, history

142. Standler, supra note 23.
143. Graburn, supra note 76, at 6-7.
144. See supra Part II.
145. See supra Part I.
146. See supra Part III.
147. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
148. Id.
149. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
150. Id. at 2588.
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continues to teach and develop traditions. 151 The Court acknowledged
different changes, such as the decline in arranged marriages and the
abandonment of coverture, which helped create a transformation in the
structure of marriage. 152 Moreover, the tradition of male and female
marriages was evolving. 153 As such, the notion of a tradition is a fluid
concept, established by choice and value. The Court held the
“[c]hanged understandings of marriage are characteristics of a nation
where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new
generations.” 154 As our views and values continue to evolve and grow,
so too do our traditions.
Although the history of our nation was evolving due to the
developing traditions surrounding the union of marriage, the Court did
not view this as a new established right. 155 Instead, through careful
issue framing, the Court leaned on a line of precedents that emphasized
individual autonomy, personal choice, and sexual equality. 156 The
Court relied on these pressing rights to emphasize deeply rooted history
marriage held in our nation. 157 The Court also relied on numerous cases
that held “marriage is fundamental to individuals and a building block
of society[.]” 158 Thus, the majority viewed a new class of persons being
admitted to a long-established right. 159 The majority did not see a new
history being established. 160
Additionally, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court held a state code
punishing interracial marriage was unconstitutional based on the broad
fundamental right to marriage. 161 Because Virginia was one of sixteen
states prohibiting interracial marriages, 162 a deeply rooted history or

151. See infra Part III Section C.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Cott, supra note 67.
156. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
157. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
158. Cott, supra note 67.
159. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
160. Id. at 559.
161. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). This statute followed the Racial Integrity Act of
1924, prohibiting a “white person” from marrying any other race. Id. at 6.
162. Id.
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tradition of interracial marriages did not exist. However, analogous to
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 163 the Court broadly framed this issue as
the right to marry, rather than the right to an interracial marriage.164
Consequently, the question of interracial marriage being deeply rooted
in our nation’s history and tradition was avoided entirely by the Court’s
mindful issue framing. 165 The right to marry overpowered the question
of interracial marriages. 166 With this tactic, the Court established a
pertinent, new tradition of interracial marriages. 167 Thus, through
careful issue framing, new rights deemed as historical or traditional
within our nation can be created by the Court without an explicit
requirement or two-part test provided. An official test will enable the
Court to accurately decide substantive due process issues in a
systematic process, instead of deciding based on personal preference
without supporting analysis.
C. The Correct Application of History and Tradition
In Obergefell v. Hodges, it was uncontested that the history of
marriage has always been a union between a male and a female. 168 This
historical approach required a simple analysis considering past events
regarding marriage in our nation. 169 However, applying the framework
of the two-part history and tradition test, the Court will look beyond the
challenged law, and consider the underlying circumstances driving the
right at issue. 170 The nation’s long history of promoting individual
autonomy, personal choice, and sexual equality supports the underlying
areas of the right at issue. 171 Historically, marriage in our nation has

163. 561 U.S. 742 (2010); see also supra Part II Section A.
163. Id.
164. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
169. Id.
170. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (considering the underlying
factors of marriage, including the notions of autonomy, personal choice, and sexual
equality that were driving the right at stake of same-sex marriage prohibitions).
171. See Cott, supra note 67.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol57/iss1/13

20

Ligioso: Interpreting Substantive Due Process: What Does “History and Trad
Ligioso camera ready final (Do Not Delete)

2020]

INTERPRETING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

1/26/2021 10:36 AM

173

also changed over time. 172 This aspect of marriage was highlighted
further when racial restrictions in marriage were deemed
unconstitutional. 173 Beyond the challenged law of same-sex marriage,
the underlying framework of marriage holds a well-established history
of evolution and development. 174 Thus, same-sex marriage is not only
supported by the history of marriage, it also ties to personal choice, and
the notion of individual autonomy. 175 This right is also rooted in history
because of the long past of marriage changing and evolving. 176 Thus,
a deeply rooted history can be established in same-sex marriage based
on past events supporting freedom of choice in marriage and the
underlying concept of marriage continually changing and evolving in
our nation.
With respect to tradition, the Court noted the history of marriage
was one of “both continuity and change,” 177 highlighting an essential
element of a tradition analysis: change. However, the Court did not
engage in an analysis of tradition, 178 likely because a clear definition
had not yet been established. 179 With marriage established as a concept
of change and continuity, the Court could have done an analysis on
tradition instead of avoiding it altogether. Change and value are vital
to a tradition analysis, and the Court already highlighted how much
personal autonomy and sexual equality were valued by our nation in the
choice to marry. 180 These concepts were not new; they were passed
down from a line of precedent. 181 Our nation deeply values sexual
equality and marriage, and these values are areas of continuity and
change. 182 Because these concepts of marriage and sexual equality
were already deeply valued in our nation, the right to same-sex marriage
172. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (discussing the elimination of arranged
marriage and coverture).
173. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
174. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2595.
178. Id. at 2602.
179. The Court avoided a history and tradition analysis by viewing this as an
Equal Protection issue. Id.
180. See id. at 2584.
181. Cott, supra note 67; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
182. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588.
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meets the requirements of a tradition, based on our nation’s values and
choices. Moreover, these long-held values of sexual equality and
personal autonomy established same-sex marital rights, which evolved
into a finally recognized (but not new) tradition. 183 Due to this, samesex marriage equality could also be deemed a value deeply rooted in
our nation’s tradition. The notion of marriage being a building block
for society and fundamental to individuals further supported the
position that this newly recognized tradition helped provide a sense of
identity, which is fundamental to society. 184
Thus, based on our nation’s value of sexual equality and personal
choice, same-sex marriage was implicitly rooted in our nation’s history.
Same-sex marriage was also deeply rooted in our nation’s tradition
based on our nation’s values regarding the continuity and change of
marriage, personal autonomy, and sexual equality. Although this case
was correctly decided, the Court did not engage in any meaningful
analysis of history and tradition or apply any type of test. 185 This lack
of uniformity or clear definitions of the two terms creates a sense of
uncertainty for decisions of future cases. It also opens the Court to a
significant amount of scrutiny and critique in terms of deciding future
cases based on potential judicial preference rather than engaging a
meaningful substantive due process analysis.
An analysis of history and tradition was almost applied in
McDonald v. City of Chicago. 186 The Court acknowledged the rights
to bear arms and of self-defense are deeply rooted in our nation’s
history, which were included in the Second Amendment. 187 Instead of
looking directly at the challenged law, the Court correctly considered
the underlying components that made up the right at issue. 188 Here, the
underlying aspects of the right to bear arms were the right to protect
one’s home and the right to self-defense. 189 The Court properly found
that the right to self-defense was deeply rooted in our nation’s history

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id.
Cott, supra note 67.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Id. at 780.
Id.
Id. at 742.
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based on the Second Amendment and the history of the underlying
components making up the right. 190
However, the other half of the test was never addressed. Instead,
the Court conflated history and tradition together without establishing
how the right was deeply rooted in our nation’s tradition. 191 Here, the
right to bear arms was so highly valued that the newly-formed
government found it to be a fundamental right. 192 “[A]nd those who
were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe
traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the
adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the
Constitution.”193 This recognized tradition was established and
preserved by our nation’s values.
While the Court correctly decided these cases, it did so without
applying a full analysis of history and tradition. 194 Rather, the Court
was able to shift its focus entirely to history and ignore the tradition
component of the analysis. Or perhaps the Court avoided the analysis
entirely by centering the right on a different constitutional area of
issue. 195 Without a test separately addressing history and tradition, the
ramifications could go beyond a mere lack of strength in substantive
due process analyses. If the Court does not have such a test to follow,
this could impact solutions to the Coronavirus pandemic (“COVID19”). 196 Because potential solutions or attempts to avoid additional
COVID-19 outbreaks might not be part of our nation’s history and
tradition at first glance, the Court could easily deny a right on its face.
However, with this two-part test, the Court would have structure in

190. Id. at 780.
191. Id. at 742.
192. Id. at 769.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 742; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
195. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (describing the Courts focus on
Equal Protection as the heart of its argument, rather than engaging in a history and
tradition analysis).
196. The Coronavirus is a respiratory illness, referred to as “COVID-19,” and
created a worldwide pandemic in 2019. Lauren M. Sauer, M.S., What Is
HOPKINS
MED.
(June
27,
2020),
Coronavirus?,
JOHN
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus.
(explaining that the Coronavirus is a respiratory illness, referred to as “COVID-19,”
that created a worldwide pandemic in 2019).
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deciding these current and pressing issues with clarity. While a
fundamental right might not be part of our nation’s history and tradition
on the exterior, a closer look following the proposed test’s guidelines
could in fact uncover underlying roots of history or values establishing
a tradition in our nation. The fundamental rights of Americans could
be at risk without clear definitions and uses of the terms in a substantive
due process analysis. This two-part test will not only strengthen the
Court’s analysis and provide clarity in substantive due process issues,
but it will also ensure protection of Americans’ fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
Substantive due process protects fundamental rights, and history
and tradition are separate, distinct terms that play imperative roles in
that analysis. There is value in keeping the terms removed from one
another because of the different definitions each term brings to the
analysis. A test requiring the separate evaluation of history and
tradition will positively impact substantive due process decisions by
creating uniformity and eliminating the vague use of the two terms.
Additionally, the test will force the Court to analyze the terms
separately. The current lack of clear guidance has left the Court with
broad discretion to decide which rights are deeply rooted in our history
and traditions and which are not, without supporting analysis. The
outcome of the same-sex marriage ban weighing down on a grieving
spouse could have been severely impacted if the Court vaguely lumped
the two terms together without finding another constitutional issue in
the case. Future cases might not be as fortunate without a history and
tradition test applied.
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By implementing a two-part test that analyzes history and tradition
separately, substantive due process cases will not be able to be decided
by conveniently avoiding one term over the other, based on judicial
preference. The benefit of a two-part test goes beyond clear guidance
for the Court when interpreting constitutional law. The test ensures
protection for fundamental rights that could otherwise been overlooked
or misconstrued to not be deeply rooted in our nation’s history and
tradition. For this reason, a test separately focusing on history and
tradition will ensure a balanced analysis to determine whether a right
will be afforded substantive due process protection.
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